Integrating PBEE and Network Analysis to Measure Resilience Performance Objectives by Ceferino, Luis et al.
Step 4: All the buildings and network components shown in Fig. 3 and described in Step 3 (except for the
electric power lines) are considered susceptible to damage and have associated fragility functions selected
from [2], [6], [7].
Step 5: Recovery paths defined according to HAZUS and the REDi procedure.
• For buildings, in addition to physical repair times, impeding factors such as inspection, engineering
mobilization, contractor mobilization, financing, and permitting were included.
• Network components’ recovery times are modeled as per [2] methodology and they do not include
impeding factors.
• For a given community, correlation in the recovery times of buildings was considered by sampling
recovery time associated impeding factors of buildings in different damage states from a multivariate
lognormal distribution with a correlation coefficient of 0.5.
Step 6: Modeling of the urban system under earthquake stress.
• Sample different realizations of correlated ground motions (see Fig. 4).
• Sample damage states and recovery times for each urban system component, considering correlation
where appropriate.
• Apply network analysis to each realization of the dynamic interdependent network to verify delivery of
water to the 3 communities at each time step after the earthquake.
• Resilience agencies (e.g., [1]) have published “current” and “target” regional resilience performance of key
city infrastructure after an earthquake scenario (see Fig. 1). The resilience performance explicitly considers
the two dimensions of the recovery process: functionality and time after the earthquake.
• Previous regional risk estimation techniques (e.g., HAZUS [2]) built initial robust methodologies for
assessing expected values of earthquake consequences.
A probabilistic framework for assessing “current” and “target” regional resilience performance of key
urban functions was presented. This framework combines recent advances in earthquake risk analysis and
network analysis to provide probabilistic quantification of performance and assess the likelihood of
achieving resilience performance objectives (RPO) in an urban system under the stress of an earthquake.
This case study exemplifies the usability of this framework. In this example, shelter-in-place is
defined as a building that is undamaged or is repaired with access to water. The analysis is done
for a Mw 7.0 earthquake that affects 3 communities. The following gives a brief description of the
analysis steps.
Step 1:
• Stakeholder: the municipality and the tenants.
• RDV: percentage of housing units that can function as shelter in-place (building repaired +
water and wastewater systems functioning).
• RPO: 95% of housing units, 24 h after the earthquake.
Step 2: Earthquake scenario of Mw 7.0. The ground motion is simulated for a 70x25 km area with
a resolution of 1x1km
Step 3: (see Fig. 3)
• Building stock: 3 communities (C1, C2, and C3 denoted by green triangles) with 30 buildings
each comprised of 3 types of reinforced concrete buildings with different number of stories.
• Water network (in blue): one water reservoir that delivers water through two main pipes with
corresponding pumps to the communities, the thermoelectric plant and the substation.
• Power network (in red): the thermoelectric plant delivers power to the substation, and then
the power is distributed to the pumps, the wastewater treatment plant and to the
communities.
• Wastewater network (in magenta): The wastewater from the thermoelectric plant and the
communities is pumped to a treatment plant.
The urban networks are interdependent.
• The thermoelectric plant (power net.) requires water (from water net.) for cooling and
functional wastewater network.
• The pumps (water and wastewater net.) need power (from power net.) to work.
Proof of concept: measuring shelter-in-place availability
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• The objective of this research is to provide an analytical framework to support ongoing community
resilience planning initiatives, incorporating the analysis of built environment vulnerabilities and key urban
interdependencies as outlined in [3].
• This poster describes the proposed framework that uses a probabilistic approach to measure “current”
resilience performance and assesses the likelihood of reaching community scale Resilience Performance
Objectives (RPO) (e.g., performance targets in SPUR) by utilizing and drawing inspiration from the modular
analysis of Performance Based Earthquake Engineering (PBEE) and explicitly incorporating network analysis
of interdependent urban systems.
• This framework does not attempt to refine or advance specific risk or network analysis techniques, but to
provide a way to unify current resilience, network and risk research and channel it towards helping decision
makers measure resilience goals.
Earthquake Resilience
Summary and Continuing Work
Framework:  steps for evaluating RPO’s
The framework has been broken down into 7 steps. Fig. 2 provides a graphical representation of the
analysis workflow.
Step 1: Identify the stakeholder, resilience performance measure, referred to as  Resilience Decision 
Variable (RDV), and RPO. The RPO is the target performance with two dimensions: RDV 
threshold reached at a target time after the earthquake. Ex. RDV: number of functional 
hospitals [1], RPO: 100% functioning 24 hrs after the earthquake.
Step 2: Define hazard level for the RPO. Ex. earthquake scenario that corresponds to a shaking level 
with 10% chance of occurrence in 50 years [1].
Step 3: Identify relevant urban components. In this context, urban components refer to all the 
buildings and network systems that need to be considered to quantify the RDV.  Then, identify 
the interdependencies among  the urban components. Ex. Urban components for hospital 
functionality: hospital buildings, water network (pumps, pipelines and reservoirs), wastewater 
network (pipelines, pumps, treatment plant), and power network (power plants, and power 
lines and substations). Interdependencies: pumps (for the water network) require power (from 
the power network) to function [3].
Step 4: Identify  appropriate fragility functions for the urban components that are susceptible to 
earthquake damage.
Step 5: Identify urban components’ recovery curves,  while considering impeding factors, correlation 
and constraints, where appropriate. 
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Figure 1. “Current” (in blue) and “target ” (in X) performances in San Francisco 
after a Mw 7.2 on the San Andreas Fault. The “current” performance was 
assessed by expert opinion (Source: [1]).
Step 6: Modeling of the urban system under earthquake stress:
•Model earthquake rupture and ground motions, considering spatial correlation.
•Model individual urban components’damage states, for components that are susceptible to 
damage.
•Model individual urban components’ recovery times, given a damage state.
•Model the functionality of the interdependent urban network. The most recent developments 
take into account explicit treatment of dynamic network interdependencies [5]. 
• Quantify RDV’s distribution at each time step after the earthquake.
Step 7: Quantify the probability of meeting the RPO and the time required to meet the RDV threshold
with a specified confidence level.
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the steps for Resilience Performance Objective quantification.
Figure 4. A realization of 
peak ground acceleration 
(PGA) affecting the urban 
system.
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• Currently, there is no systematic
methodology for probabilistic
quantification of regional resilience
performance objectives that integrates
new advances in earthquake
engineering (e.g., spatially correlated
ground motion modeling) and network
analysis, which enables the modeling
of key dependencies of urban systems
identified as significant in the NIST
resilience planning guidelines [3].
• The proposed methodology aims to
integrate the advances in earthquake
engineering and network analysis in
order to assess “current” and “target”
regional resilience performance of key
infrastructure such as the ones
outlined in Fig. 1.
Figure 3. Earthquake scenario (in black) and built environment: 3 communities (in green), water (in blue), power
(in red), and wastewater (in magenta) networks.
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Step 7: The distribution of the RDV and is shown in Figure 5. To the left, where impeding factors in the
recovery are considered, the “current” performance is far below the resilience “target” (RPO). No
realization met with the RPO, and the 80% central confidence interval revealed that 95% shelter in-place is
reached between 1.2 and 3.2 years. This striking mismatch between the “current” and “target” is similar to
the expected shelter in-place performance in San Francisco (Fig. 1). To the right, where impeding factors
are not considered, no realization met the RPO, and 80% central confidence interval was 0.20 to 1.1 years.
• Extension of the case study to real communities and networks in order to verify that the presented
methodology scales to a larger, more realistic urban system.
• Analysis of the most contributing factors, or ‘bottlenecks’ in recovery process, as related to meeting RPO.
• Development of data driven correlation models for buildings’ impeding factors, as more recovery data
becomes available.
• Inclusion of impeding factors in network systems’ recovery and introduction of repair sequencing in
distributed networks.
The framework is composed of 7 steps that go from the model definition through to the model analysis. A
proof of concept example is presented to demonstrate the applicability of the framework and to show the
relevance of the results. The example showed the relevance of the impeding factors on the recovery.
Continuing work will include:
